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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HOGGAN & HALL &
HIGGINS, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
NELSON W. HALL and
RAYMOND C. HIGGINS,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
10453

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This action was instituted by plaintiff, a Utah
corpora ti on, engaged in the advertising business
against the individual defendants who are stockholders of plaintiff corporation and were prior to
March 1, 1964 officers and directors of plaintiff
corporation, for ( 1) Injunctive relief to restrain defendant from soliciting the company advertising accounts, (2) For damages in the amount of $75,000.00, ( 3) The return of plaintiff's files and records removed by defendants, ( 4) $500.00 owed by
defendant Hall to plaintiff, and ( 5) Return of the
company Plymouth automobile in the possession of
defendant Hall or the value.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the time this law suit was commenced on
March 11, 1964 for the relief set forth above, plaintiff also moved the Court for a preliminary injunrtion to (a) Restrain defendants from further solicitation of plaintiff's advertising customers, (b) To
return all advertising data, material, and files removed from the premises of plaintiff, ( c) From
copying or in any manner using any information
contained in said advertising data, materials, and
files, and ( d) To compel defendant, Nelson W. Hall,
to return a 1963 Plymouth automobile.
On March 20 through March 23, 1964 a hearing was held in the District Court of Salt Lake
County before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson
on plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
After extensive testimony on the matter, an injunction was entered by the Court restraining de- ,
fendants from the further solicitation of plaintiff's
customers and commanding defendants to return
the files and recorps removed from the offices of
plaintiff, except such material that as in the custom
of the trade, was the property of the client and ordering the defendants not to use certain of the material
which was developed while defendants were in the
employ of plaintiff. Defendant Hall had returned
the Plymouth automobile prior to the hearing on
plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and
this item was abandoned at the time of hearing.
The action was tried before Judge Parley E.
2

Norseth of the Second Judicial District in Salt Lake
County, Utah on January 21 and 22, 1965. After
the submission of Briefs, the Court entered a Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants in the amount of $25,000.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the Judgment in
their favor, no cause of action, as a matter of law;
or that failing, reversal of the Judgment and Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but for nominal
damages only; or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as stated by appellants in their Brief
are as they contend them to be and not as they must
be stated on appeal, favorable to the Judgment of
the lower court, hence a further statement is necessary in this Brief, even though there will be some
repetition.
Plaintiff corporation is engaged in the advertising business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Generally an advertising agency and also this
plaintiff prepares advertising copy, distinctive slogans, art work, and layouts for its customers and
places this advertising with the media such as newspapers, radio and television. The advertising agency
is billed by the media and in turn bills its clients.
For the most part, its income is derived on the
basis of 15 per cent of the dollar volume of advertising placed with the media (Ex. 15p sets forth
3

the agency procedure of the plaintiff corporation
in detail.) .
The plaintiff corporation was incorporated on
March 1, 1960 and at the time of the trial of this
action, the stock in the corporation was owned as
follows:
E. D. Hoggan -17,249 shares
Nelson W. Hall- 5,246 shares
Raymond C. Higgins - 1,000 shares
Qualifying shares were also owned by the wives
of Mr. Hoggan and Mr. Hall. Mr. Hoggan, Mr. Hall
and Mr. Higgins were each officers and directors
of the plaintiff corporation. Mr. Higgins joined the
corporation as a stockholder, officer, and director
in September, 1963 or approximately 6 months before the events giving rise to this law suit (R.
229-230).
Before incorporation in March, 1960, this advertising agency had been conducted under the partnership style and was composed of Mr. Hoggan and
Mr. Hall and a Mr. Parkin. Mr. Parkin had no
interest in the company at the time the law suit
was commenced.
At the end of 1963, the Boise Cascade Company,
a large lumber manufacturer and distributor, had
elected to place all of its advertising with its agency
in Boise, Idaho. It withdrew its patronage from the
plaintiff corporation. The Boise Cascade account
was a major revenue producer for the corporation
4

and Mr. E. D. Hoggan devoted approximately 75
per cent of his time to the advertising business of
that account.
After the first of the year ( 1964), Mr. Hall
and Mr. Higgins became dissatisfied because the
corporation showed a small loss in January (the
profit and loss statement for February had not been
prepared when the events giving rise to this law
suit occurred) .
As a result of this dissatisfaction, Mr. Higgins
called for a meeting of the three principals (Hoggan, Hall & Higgins) to discuss agency affairs. The
importance of the meetings of February 14, through
February 18, 1964 between these principals cannot
be underestimated and the discussion and results
are now set forth in detail.
Following is the testimony of Mr. Hoggan:
"A. I recall a meeting. My recollection
it was February 14th. A Friday evening.
"Q. A Friday evening, February 14th?
''A. Yes.
'''Q. Do you keep a journal, Mr. Hoggan?
"A. I do.
"Q. And did you make notes concerning
that meeting?
"A. I did.
"'Q. Now will you tell us your recollection as to what was said by the three who attended that meeting?
5

"A. In the afternoon of the 14th Mr.
Higgins asked if he and Mr. Hall might have
a meeting with me immediately following
work, and I said yes. We left the office around
5 :00 o'clock and went up to Mr. Hall's apartment, which was above the corporation office
on 5th East. Mr. Higgins - I think, if I
remember correctly - broached the subject
that the corporation had been losing money
during January, and it looked like we would
face an equally heavy loss i'n February. I said
I was very well aware of it, because I had
worked on it with the accountant and the
bookkeeper in regard to both months.
"Q. What did that loss appear to be?
"A. It at that time was between
$1,500.00 and $1,800.00 a month.
'"Q. What else was discussed between
you?
"A. Mr. Higgins said he was quite seriously worried and I said: 'I see no great
cause for alarm. This is our slow period of
the year. It invariably has been for years.'
On general accounts the fall and winter season are usually slow. From November through
March.
"Q. Has this been your past experience
in the advertising business?
"A. That is correct. We have always had
a slump and faced a serious loss the first
quarter of the year, so I said: ''I have no immediate worry, although we will have to do
something about it. We are adequately financed, and we can exist for awhile without
anything serious happening. In the meantime
we will solicit accounts.' I said: 'I already
6

have several good prospects.' He said 'I acknowledge that, but prospects do not produce
money. Would you be willing to take a cut
in salary?', and I said: 'If you are talking
about an equal cut, yes.' I said: 'I have already taken one cut, to reduce my salary
down to the level of yours and Nels', but if
you wish it I will take another cut, providing
it's equal, down to $800.00 or $750.00 a
month,' and Ray said: 'What else do we have
to explore? Shall we reduce personnel?,' and
I said: 'I'm perfectly willing to let two of
the girls go. One or two.' He said : 'How
about Mrs. Hoopes? Shall we let her go, and
you may service her accounts?', and I said:
'Mrs. Hoopes is a very capable employee of
the firm. One of the most talented and versatile people I have met in the advertising
field. I wouldn't consider that. The other two
girls, yes. But not Mrs. Hoopes. We will have
to have people of her caliber here.' Then he
said: 'You won't consider a cut in salary?'
and I said: 'I will go along with whatever
cut you and Nels propose.' He said: 'No. I
mean you take the cut in salary,' and I said:
'What are you thinking about?' He said:
'You take no salary, as far as I'm concerned,
until you're producing again,' and I said:
'Ray, I have the biggest investment in this
thing. This represents my lifetime savings.
This is here for one definite purpose, and
that's to tide us over a tough period. I invested it only for that reason. To operate a
corporation, and make a living out of it.' I
said: 'I'm entitled to something for that,'
and he said: 'For my money you're entitled
to nothing.' He said: 'You're not producing,
and consequently you deserve no money.' I
7

said: 'Do you feel the same way about it
Nels?', and he said he refused to take a
in salary.
"Then we discussed at some length the
idea of what corporate reserves are for. I
said: 'In years past, Ray, every account executive ever employed has lost accounts and
never been penalized by cuts in salary. I don't
know why I should be at this time,' and Nels
said: 'Well, how long do you propose to draw
this salary?' I said: 'Well, theoretically,
Nels, I could draw it until the corporation's
reserves are entirely exhausted and we go
down the drain. In practicality, I have no intentions to do so. I think we can have this
thing back on its feet within three to six
months' time' and Ray said he didn't propose to stay around and watch us lose money,
he didn't propose to stay around and see the
firm go bankrupt, and I said: 'I think you're
making a foolish mistake, because the three
of us together are much stronger than we are
individually.'
~'That was my reply to them, to stay, and
Ray said: 'No, I have had enough. I'm leaving. \Vhat about my accounts?', and I said:
'Your accounts you brought in here, Ray,
legally the firm may have some claim on them.
Morally I don't think we have any claim at
all, so I'll release your accounts.' He said:
'What about my furn'iture?,' and I said:
'Well, you turn back your stock on behalf
of the corporation, and I'll release your furniture and call it quits. Let's part as easily as
we can, with a minimum of friction, and you
can be on your way.'

cut
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"'THE COURT: Was that with Mr.
Higgins?
"THE WITNESS: Mr. Higgins, yes.
"THE COURT: Thank you.
"THE WITNESS: I said this to Mr.
Higgins.
"Q. Mr. Hoggan, you previously have
been sworn as a witness in this case. When we
finished last night the last part of your testimony had to do with the conversation on the
14th of February, and you were discussing
and relating what was said by you to Mr.
Higgins concerning his accounts, where you
indicated that you had perhaps a legal cla'im
but no moral claim on them. Will you continue from there, please?
"A. Well, we continued the conversation
on this vein. I was attempting to explain the
financial stability of the organization, the fact
that the reserves were accumulated to tide
us over such emergencies, that previously account executives had lost accounts without
being penalized, and that I saw no reason
why they should demand this from me, a complete lack of salary, during this period. I said
I had made the big investment in the corporation, and my investment had carried it
through a lot of rough times in years past.
"Ray then stated that he saw no need for
money. He said perhaps he had been fortunate in his operation, but he saw no need for
a tremendous amount of capital, and I said:
'It's always been our experience that we are
faced with a great many accounts receivable
continuously.' I pointed out that several of
9

Mr. Hall's accounts were in arrears four and
five months, for several thousand dollars, and
that it was necessary that we carry at least
part of this continuously. That we were up
against a payroll and fixed expenses in overhead every month. Regardless of whether the
accounts paid us or not, those salaries had
been paid in the past.
"Ray still insisted that there be no salary
drawn on my part, and I said: 'In that case,
Ray, evidently we can't reach an agreement
on this thing. You are not being penalized
on this. The great loss to the company is coming from my investment, which is 75%, Mr.
Hall has taken 20 %, and you are accepting
5 % of every dollar lost. This is not very
great odds on your part.'
"Ray said regardless of that he didn't
want to stay around while the corporation
lost money, and I said: 'Then there's only
one thing to do. I suppose you want out?'
He said: 'I do,' and I said: 'Then we can
negotiate to release your furniture and fixtures. You will turn back in your stock, and
let's separate as amicably as possible.' He
said: 'What about Mr. Hall? He may want
to leave too. What about his account?', and
I said: 'Mr. Hall has no accounts, Ray. The
accounts belong to the corporation. They were
largely sold by me, my investment has financed them and I have assisted in their servicing. They were all done with the intent that
this is corporation, and that you can't separate
the affairs of one person from another.
They're not Mr. Hall's accounts. I stand on
that.'
"Ray then said he had a dinner engage10

ment - it was then nearly 8 :00 o'clock, we
had been three hours in session - and I
said: 'Well, I would like to stay and talk with
Mr. Hall.' He said: 'It looks like we have
finished our affairs, and the argument now
is between you and Mr. Hall.' I said it was
no argument. I merely wanted to stay and
talk with Mr. Hall, and get a few other things
straightened out. He excused himself in the
neighborhood of a quarter to 8 :00 o'clock,
and I stayed and talked with Mr. Hall.
"The jist of the conversation was that I
asked, I said: 'You understand what I'm getting at, Nels, in relation to this financial situation?' He said: 'I do perfectly. But Ray,'
Mr. Higgins: 'does not. He says every time
you mention financing he gets mad, because
he doesn't understand it.' 'Well,' I said: 'that
being the case, he evidently [doesn't] belong
in agency management. If he cannot appreciate profit and loss, depreciation, and all these
other factors.' 'Well, he said: 'you have got
to give him his own way, or the whole thing
will crash down.' I said: 'Nels, in all conscience I can't give him his own way. If I
step down now, and turn over the management of this corporation to Ray, then I'm
finished. I have had it completely. I don't propose to do that. There is nothing legally or
morally that can force me to do it.' I said:
'I intend upon remaining as manager of this
corporation, and as such I will continue to
draw a salary.' I said: 'I don't understand
your feeling in this regard, because I think
you will admit that I have always treated
you fairly and honestly in all of our transactions.'
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"He admitted that I had, the conversation
was continued for a short time longer, and
the telephone rang. I was close to it and I
answered it. Mr. Higgins was on the phone,
and he asked to speak to Mr. Hall. Then Ml'.
Hall said: 'You'll have to excuse me. We
have a dinner date with Mr. and Mrs. Higgins.' So I excused myself at that time and
left. That was still on the evening of the 14th
of February.

"Q. All right. Did you have a further
conversation with Mr. Hall the following day?
"A. The following day was Saturday. I
came down to work at about 9 :30. My wife
dropped me off at the office and went downtown. I was there for approximately an hour,
the telephone rang, and it was a personal call
for Mr. Hall. He had an extension telephone
from the main telephone in the office and I
transferred it upstairs, and after the light
had gone off on the phone I dialed Mr. Hall
and asked if he would like to talk. He said
he had just gotten out of bed and he couldn't
come down, but if I would come up he would
be glad to make me a cup of coffee.
"Q. Did you have a conversation with
him at that place and at that time?
"A. Yes. I went up to his apartment,
and I tried to talk. Nels was quite non-communicative. I asked him if he'd made up his
mind what he was going to do, and he said he
had not. That was the sum and substance of
that conversation.
"Q. All right. Now did you have a further conversation with Mr. Higgins and Mr.
12

Hall subsequent to that Saturday, concerning
the affairs of the corporation?
"A. Nothing on Monday. I was in Ogden
on a business call, a prospect, and returned
at 1 :30. There was nothing said there. On
Monday. On Tuesday Mrs. Hoopes, Mr. Parkin and I went out to the south area of the
County on another prospect call, and we returned about 11 :00. I would say somewhere
around 3 :00 in the afternoon Mr. Higgins
asked me if we could have another meeting.
"Q. What day was this again?
"'A. That was on Tuesdav. That would
be the 18th.
~
"Q. All right. And did you have a meeting that evening?
A. We had a meeting that evening.
"Q. Who was present besides the three
of you?
"A. At 5 :00 o'clock. Mr. Hall, Mr. Higgins and myself.
"Q. All right. What was discussed at
that time?
"A. It was a very short meeting. Mr.
Higgins announced that Mr. Hall was leaving. I expressed my regrets, and I said: "Wh3:t
about the accounts?' He said: 'We have
those all locked in."
"Q. Who said that?
"A. Mr. Higgins. And I said: 'Is this
true, Nels?' He said: 'Yes, we have the business.'
"Q. What else was said?
13

"A. I said : 'When did you do this?
When did you make up your mind?' He said·
'I talked to you Saturday. Subsequent to Sat~
urday.' I said: 'What have you been doing?'
and he said: 'We have been out getting these
accounts lined up.' I said: 'Well, I can't believe it. I can't believe that you'd be that shortsighted and stupid.' He said: 'What is wrong
with that?' I said: 'Well, you're conspiring
to destroy your own corporation for one thing.
You're soliciting the accounts of the business,' and I said : 'I take a very very dim
view of this thing.'
"Then Mr. Higgins said: 'Why don't you
face it, Ned? You have had it.' He said: 'We
have all the business, and all you have left
is this bunch of old furniture downstairs and
some money in the bank.' He said: 'Why don't
you be a good guy, and buy Nels out and release him? We'll be on our way, and we'll
bear you no hard feelings at all.' I said:
'That is very generous of you. I'm not in any
position to buy Nels out. I don't intend to go
out of business, nor do I intend to dissolve
the corporation. It would take a great many
months to collect all of our accounts receivable and dispose of the other assets, and I
don't propose to do this.' He said: 'Well, you
won't give us an answer now?' I said: 'Of
course I won't give you an answer now. You
have evidently taken some time in making up
your mind as to what you were going to do,
and I'm going to ask the same consideration ... ' (R-233-242)."
'The testimony of Mr. Hall and Mr. Higgins
concerning the meetings does not vary materially
14

from the testimony of Mr. Hoggan which has been
quoted extensively above. Neither of the defendants
deny that they had informed Mr. Hogan that they
had the accounts and Mr. Hall testified:
Did you make a statement - specifically, or in substance - that you had the
accounts, and were taking them with
you?
"A. In substance, that I knew accounts were
corning with me.
"Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. Hall, by that
time you had agreements with these people? By that I mean their assent to go
with you? Is that correct?
"A. I had an understanding that some were
coming with me, yes." ( R. 132)
Mr. Hall contacted five of the six accounts on
Monday, February 17, 1964. It will be noted that
at this time, Mr. Hall had not advised anyone of
his decision to leave the corporation and, in fact,
had informed Mr. Hoggan that he did not know
what he would do. Only after he had obtained assurances that the accounts he had been servicing would
go with him when he left the plaintiff corporation,
did he announce that he had been contacting the accounts and that he intended to leave the plaintiff
corporation.
"Q.

Obviously his decision to leave the plaintiff was
prompted by his good fortune in having obtained
the advertising business of these accounts. Thus emboldened he announced to Mr. Hoggan that he was
15

leaving and taking the business with him (R. 131132.)
Although Mr. Hall throughout the course of the
proceedings in this law suit has consistently attempted to cast the impression that he did not solicit and
ask for the advertising business that he took with
him, his own testimony and the testimony of those
he solicited points unerringly to the conclusion that
on Monday the 17th day of February, 1964, Mr.
Hall contacted five of the six accounts he had been
servicing for the purpose of obtaining their business.
Most important is the testimony of Mr. Hall in
regard to the solicitation of the Salt Lake Mattress
Company. Mr. Hall testified:
Will you relate your conversation - at
the time that you contacted Mr. Eberhardt, of Salt Lake Mattress Company
- wherein you advised him that you
were leaving the plaintiff corporation?
"A. This was substantially the same conversation that I had had with the previous
accounts. Outlining the difficulties at the
agency. The loss that had been incurred.
The fact that Mr. Higgins was leaving.
That Mr. Hoggan had no accounts. That
we were in a s'erious position, and that I
was leaving. Then I asked Mr. Eberhardt if he would like me to continue
to service his account. Now do you want
Mr. Eberhardt's reply?"
Mr. James Eberhardt, co-owner of Salt Lake
"Q.

16

Mattress whose account had been serviced by several advertising men employed by plaintiff over a
six-year period including Mr. Hall, testified to the
meeting with Mr. Hall as follows:
Tell us what was said by each of you
at that time.
"A. Mr. Hall said that Mr. Hoggan had lost
his big account, and was drawing on the
agency. That he and Mr. Higgins were
carrying the load, in essence, and that
he was breaking away from Mr. Hoggan
and the agency that was set up, and
wanted to know if we'd go along with the
proposition. At the same time he also
stated that most of the accounts he had
contacted were going along with him.
That in essence is what he said." (R.
183)
We may correctly distill from this testimony
and particularly that of Mr. Hall that he had the
same conversation with each of the accounts he contacted and asked each of them for their advertising
business.
"Q.

Also Mr. Hall testified that before he left the
agency at the end of February, 1964, the accounts
he had contacted had "agreed" that he could continue to service the accounts (R. 135).
Of further importance to the evidence in this
case concerning the scheme of solicitation practiced
by defendants is the testimony of those solicited.
Mr. Charles Freed testified:
17

"A.

Well he informed me that he and Ned
Hoggan were splitting up. They would
no longer be together." (R. 280)
Mr. Allan E. Brockbank testified:
"A. Mr. Hall came to my office and told me
that the organization was going to be
divided and that he and Mr. Higgins
were going to form a new organization." (R.270)
Mr. Peter Wilson of Wilson Transport Supply
testified:
"A. In effect he said that there was going
to be a separation between he and Mr.
Hoggan, and that I should make a choice
as to which of the gentlemen should
handle our account, or where I wanted
to place the advertising in the future."
(R. 288)
Mr. Tony Hatsis testified:
"A. Mr. Hall came to me, I think it was the
middle or early part of February and
says that they were going to split, and
he asked me what I wanted to do, and I
says, 'Wherever you go, I want you to
handle my advertising. You are the man
that put yourself out for me. You are the
man that has done all this work.' And I
wanted him to continue my advertising."
(R. 313)
In each instance the plain implication was made
that the agency was being divided or split up. This,
of course, was not true as there had never been
any conversation between the officers, directors and
stockholders of the corporatfon concerning its dis18

solution. Also the thought was implanted in the
minds of the advertising accounts that the agency
was in financial trouble. True it had sustained
a small loss in January, but this was nothing according to Mr. Hoggan that could not be expected
at that time of year or replaced by a mutual effort
of the principals.
Mr. Hall and Mr. Higgins remained officers,
directors, and employees of the plaintiff corporation until the last day of February, 1964. As noted
above, they had obtained the advertising business
of these customers of plaintiff while still employees,
officers, and directors of plaintiff corporation. They
discussed formation of a new organization on February 19th (R. 118). Later in February, but before
they had tendered their notices of resignation, they
formed a new corporation styled as Higgins & Hall
and by March 1, 1964, the new agency was in business. At about this time (February 29, 1964) defendants Higgins and Hall entered the office of the
plaintiff corporation and removed therefrom all of
its files and records relating to the accounts that
they took with them. This was one of the subjects
of the hearing on preliminary injunction which occurred within a few weeks thereafter and much of
this material was ordered to be returned to the
plaintiff.
However, the defendant Hall was not at that
time through interfering with the business of the
plaintiff corporation. In the month of February,
19

1964 he had orally agreed on behalf of the plaintiff
corporation to a 13-week extension of certain contracts at KSL-TV for advertising broadcast time.
Thereafter on the 9th day of April 1964 at a time
when he was no longer an employee of the plaintiff
corporation, he executed on behalf of plaintiff corporation, an agreement with KSL-TV cancelling the
13-week contract on behalf of the plaintiff corporation and executing a new contract on behalf of
Higgins & Hall for the balance of the 13-week
period. These contracts were the property of the
plaintiff corporation. They had been entered into
for a period of 13 weeks with the first broadcast
date February 18, 1964. They were to run thereafter for a full period of 13 weeks. Billing on these
contracts would be to the agency that let the contract and in turn they would derive a comm'ission
on the placement of this advertising time. Obviously
Mr. Hall found that he could not get this revenue
after he left the plaintiff's employ unless and until
new contracts were written. Not only did he enter
into these contracts without authority on behalf of
the plaintiff corporation, but in clear violation of
the Court Order. (R. 177, 178 and Ex. 5-8).
Mr. Hall testified:
"Q. Were you aware that you were under a
Court Order not to interfere with the
contracts of the plaintiff corporation
on April 9, 1964?
"A.

Yes. (R. 142)
20

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS THAT DEFENDANTS SOLICITED PLAINTIFF'S ADVERTISING CUSTOMERS INCLUDING WILSON TRANSPORT SUPPLY,
BEFORE LEAVING PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOY.

Defendants argue under Point I of their brief
that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
Court's finding that they solicited the advertising
business of plaintiff, except that they admit that
they solicited the account of Wilson Transport Supply. In this regard, defendants cite the evidence
of defendant Hall and the testimony of Charles
Freed, Alan E. Brockbank, Tony Hatsis, and Frank
Shelley.
On the contrary, while Mr. Hall's solicitations
were subtle, they were nonetheless designed to take
from plaintiff the advertising accounts he had been
servicing while an employee of plaintiff. By deliberate mis-statement of facts and by taking full advantage of the intimate relationship he had with
each of the accounts, he obtained their advertising
business before he left plaintiff's employ.
There can be no doubt as to why he contacted
these accounts on February 17, 1964. He made his
purpose perfectly clear in his testimony.
Mr. Hall:
"Q. Is it you testimony then that the decision to contact the accounts and to secure their business was your own?
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"A.

Yes."

"Q.

Did you also form a conscious desire to
take your accounts that you had been
servicing with you when you left?

"A.

This would have been a natural reac.
tion, yes. ( R. 122) "

Now prior to the end of February, 1964
you considered that the business that
went with you was yours, did you not?
"A. Yes ( R. 143) ."
There can be no question that Mr. Hall's intent
was to purposely set out to divert plaintiff's business to himself. The testimony above adequately
shows this purpose.
"Q.

We come now to his method of executing this
intended plan. In the case of Mr. Eberhardt at Salt
Lake Mattress and Mr. Wilson of Wilson Transport
Supply, the defendant Hall asked them for their
business in so many words. This is admitted by
defendants (Pre-trial Order - R. 18).
CONTENTAL REALTY (Brockbank Organizations)
In this case Mr. Hall explained to Mr. Brock·
bank that the plaintiff corporation had financial
problems, that Mr. Higgins had announced his in·
tention to leave, that the agency was losing money,
and that he (Hall) couldn't continue in that sort
of an operation and that he was leaving also.
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FREED MOTOR COMPANY

Here again Mr. Hall enumerated the financial
difficulties of the plaintiff corporation, it was losing money, that it would continue to lose money,
that Mr. Hoggan had refused to take no salary or
at least a substantial cut in salary (meeting of
February 14, 1964), and that he was leaving the
agency (R. 120, 121, 122). He also left the impression with Mr. Freed that he and Mr. Hoggan were
splitting up ( R. 177) .
CLUB MANHATTAN - HOFBRAU
Mr. Hall met Mr. Hatsis as he had the others
on the 17th day of February, 1964 (Hall) testified:
"Q. State what you said to Mr. Hatsis. Not
relating to what he said.
"A. I told Mr. Hatsis I was leaving the organization I was with, and I asked what
he would like to do. ( R. 160)"
Here again a direct solicitation.
COUNTRY MUTUAL LIFE
Mr. Frank Shelley was not contacted until
March 2, 1964, but here again is evidence of a
direct attempt to divert the plaintiff's customers.
"Q. Relate what you said to Mr. Shelley at
that time without stating what he said
to you.
"A. I told Mr. Shelley I was no longer with
the former organization, but I was now
with a corporation known as Higgins &
Hall. I gave him my address and I asked
if I could continue to service his account (R. 165-166) ."
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Of these six accounts, five were contacted on
the 17th day of February, 1964 by Mr. Hall for the
purpose of obtaining their business when he left
the plaintiff corporation. At that time he either
directly asked for their business or conveyed to
them the impression that he and Mr. Hoggan were
splitting up because the corporation was beset with
severe financial problems that would make it unable to continue business. Naturally no one wants
to do business with a company that is going broke.
An advertising agency places its advertising with
the media; is billed by the media; and in turn bills
its accounts. If in fact, the plaintiff corporation
was in the serious financial condition that Mr.
Hall described, then that account would have no
choice, but to seek a new agency. Since Mr. Hall
had achieved a very intimate relationship with each
of these accounts, their decision to go with him was,
of course, predictable. He also implied that he and
Mr. Hoggan were splitting up. However, he had
never been requested to leave plaintiff's employ;
the decision was his own. Further the evidence does
not show that plaintiff corporation was in the dire
financial situation that Mr. Hall led the accounts
to believe. True it had suffered a small loss in
January, 1964, but there is evidence that these
losses would diminish and in fact the plaintiff
corporation was still in business as E. D. Hoggan
& Associates at the time of the trial of this action.
As to the Allan E. Brockbank Organizati'ons,
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Mr. Hall knew or should have known that the mention of financial disaster would have the desired
effect of getting the account. Mr. Brockbank testified that his account needed to be financed by the
advertising agency and if it wasn't so financed,
he could no longer remain with that agency ( R.
275). Mr. Hall also left the impression with these
accounts that they were "dividing up" the old
agency. The implication was that each was taking
certain accounts and going their separate ways.
Here again there is no evidence of any agreement
on behalf of these parties. Certainly the solicitation
made by defendant Hall was done without the
knowledge or consent of plaintiff.

All of the evidence of the solicitation by Hall
shows that he either directly asked for the business
or very subtly implied to the account that he had
a right to their business because the agency was
dividing up or that their account would suffer if
they did not go with him because of the financial
condition of the plaintiff. His purpose was clear
and the execution of his plan produced the desired
results.
The law does not support him in this endeavor,
but rather condemns his methods and gives rise
to an actionable wrong.
in

In Re-statement, (2d), Agency, Section 393,
( e) it is stated:
"PREPARATION

F 0 R COMPETITION
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AFTER TERMINATION OF AGENCY.
After the termination of his agency, in the
absence of a restrictive agreement, the agent
can properly compete with his principal as to
matters for which he has been employed. See
Section 396. Even before the termination of
the agency, he is entitled to make arrangements to compete, except that he cannot properly use confidential information peculiar
to his employer's business and acquired therein. Thus, before the end of his employment
he can properly purchase a rival busines~
and upon termination of employment immediately compete. He is not, however, entitled
to solicit customers for such rival business
before the end of his employment nor can he
properly do other similar acts in direct competition with the employer's business." (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence 'in this case shows that the defendant Hall, and on one occasion the defendant
Higgins, in regard to Wilson Transport Supply,
solicited the business of plaintiff's customers before they had terminated their employment with
plaintiff. In this, they violated the rule of the Restatement and the law of all jurisdictions that have
had occasion to pass on this question.
The only other case as far as is known to ever
reach a court of last resort concerning the identical
situation presented to the court in the case at bar
is the case of Duane Jones Company, Inc. vs. Burke
et al, 117 N.E. 2d 237 (New York) (1954). It
had before it the case wherein the plaintiff adver26

tising agency brought action against certain of its
former officers and employees and against a new
advertising agency formed by them for damages
arising out of the plaintiff's loss of business which
business had been pre-empted by the former officers
when they left the agency. The Duane Jones Advertising Agency was organized in 1942 by Mr.
Jones who was an experienced advertising executive and was its majority stockholder. By 1951 the
agency had acquired accounts in such number and
quality as produced a gross billing of $9,000,000.00.
Then in 1951 the agency 1'ost three of its accounts
with a total annual billing of $6,500,000.00 and
certain of the executives and staff members had
resigned from the organization. In June of 1951
a meeting was called by a number of plaintiff's
officers and directors and employees wherein Mr.
Jones was told that he should either sell his interest
in plaintiff corporation or the personnel involved
would resign en masse and form a new agency. He
was also advised that the agency's customers had
been ''already pre-sold" on the idea of joining a
new agency. Negotiations for the sale of Mr. Jones'
stock did not materialize and in August and September of 1951, a number of the officers and employes of the plaintiff corporation left and joined
the new agency which was a corporation they had
recently formed. Prior to leaving, they solicited
and obtained a substantial number of plaintiff's
customers and shortly after the new corporation
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was organized, it was servicing the advertising business of these customers.
Plaintiff filed the action seeking damages from
the defendants sustained as a result of a conspiracy
by them to deprive plaintiff of its principal customers and certain of its key employees. Many of the
rulings of the New York Court are applicable to
this case concerning all points raised by the appellants in the case at bar including solicitation, proximate cause, and damages. Respondent cites the following pertinent observations of the New York
Court:
"The foregoing evidence has led us to conclude that the conduct of the individual defendants-appellants as officers, directors or
employees of the plaintiff corporation '* * *
fell below the standard required by the law
of one acting as an agent or employee of another.' Lamdin vs. Broadway Surface Adv.
Corp., 272 N. Y. 133, 138, 5 N.E. 2d 66, 67.
Each of these defendants was '* * * prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent
with his agency or trust and [was] at all
times bound to exercise the utmost good faith
and loyalty in the performance of his duties.'
272 N.Y. at Page 138, 5 N.E. 2d at Page 67.
Plaintiff's evidence - which the jury apparently believed - established that on June 28,
1951, the individual defendants-appellants
met and agreed to take over the business of
the plaintiff agency, either by purchase of the
controlling interest in the corporation or by
resignation en masse and the formation of a
new agency; that at that meeting it was pro28

posed that the defendants contact plaintiff's
customers whose advertising accounts were
then being serviced by the defendants as account executives of plaintiff, with reference
to prospective control of plaintiff's business
by the individual defendants; that on July
3rd the employee-defendants offered to purchase, at a fixed price, the controlling interest in plaintiff agency and stated that, if
the offer were not accepted, they would resign and that plaintiff's customers had been
'presold' on the proposed action ; that a day
or two after termination of unsuccessful
negotiation for their purchase of the stock,
the defendants who were officers and directors submitted to plaintiff their resignations
from those positions, all (save one) of which
resignations were received by plaintiff on the
same day and were in substantially identical
form; that three of the individual defendants
immediately commenced negotiations leading
to the incorporation of August 23rd of a rival
advertising agency which agency commenced
operations on September 10th; that on or
about the time it commenced business, the
defendant agency had as its customers
nine accounts formerly serviced by plaintiff
and employed more than 50 per cent of plaintiff's personnel; that the accounts and personnel were acquired through solicitation by,
or at the direction of, the individual defendants prior to or during the period when they
were completing their duties as empl'Oyees of
plaintiff; and finally, that the rival agency
was formed and the accounts and personnel
were solicited without disclosure of such activities to plaintiff.
"The inferences reasonably to be drawn from
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the record justify the conclusion - reached
b~ ~h~ jury and a ma~ori~~ of the Appellate
D1v1s1on - that the ind1v1dual defendants.
appellants, while employees of plaintiff cor.
poration determined upon a course of conduct which, when subsequently carried out
resulted in benefit to themselves through de~
struction of plaintiff's business, in violation
of the fiduciary duties of good faith and fair
dealing imposed on defendants by their close
relationship with plaintiff corporation. The
jury's determination of those questions of
fact - affirmed by the Appellate Division
- is beyond our power to disturb. 'If conflicting inferences are possible as to abuse or
opportunity, the trier of the facts must make
the choice between them. There can be no revision in this court unless the choice is clearly wrong.' Meinhard vs. Salmon, 249 N.Y.
458, 467, 164 N.E. 545, 548, 62 A.L.R. l."
A $300,000.00 verdict in favor of plaintiff
against defendants was affirmed on appeal.
Applicable, also is the fact in the Duane Jones'
case at least one of the accounts was solicited after
the defendants terminated their employ.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DE·
FENDANT HIGGINS PARTICIP~TED IN THE COM·
MISSION OF THE TORT AGAINST PLAINTIFF.

The lower court found that Mr. Higgins assist·
ed Mr. Hall in the solicitation of the plaintiff's customers and was equally liable to plaintiff corpor·
a ti on.
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In his Brief, defendant Higgins charges that
there is not sufficient evidence to show that he acted
in concert with Mr. Hall for the solicitation of plaintiff's customers and, therefore, that he is innocent
and that the liability, if any, in this case belonged
to defendant Hall.
While the conduct of defendant Higgins is not
as flagrant in this case as that of defendant Hall,
it is nonetheless tortious and he is jointly responsible with defendant Hall.
He first of all concedes that during the week
of February 17, 1964 he visited Mr. Peter Wilson
of Wilson Transport Supply and assisted Mr. Hall
in the solicitation of that account (R. 217). Important to his liability is the fact that he then knew
that Mr. Hall had contacted the other accounts and
knew that they were coming with him and he and
Mr. Hall had also by that time (February 19)
discussed the formation of a new advertising agency
in which he would participate. Before each had terminated his employment with the plaintiff corporation, the corporation of Higgins & Hall had been
formed and was in business on March 1, 1964.
The evidence further shows according to the
testimony of Mr. Hoggan that the attempted destruction of the plaintiff corporation was a joint
affair on behalf of both Mr. Hall and Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Hoggan testified:
"A.

It was a very short meeting. Mr. Hig31

gins announced that Mr. Hall was leav.
ing. I expressed my regrets and I said:
'What abount the accounts?' He said:
'We have those all locked in.'" (R. 241)
. . . "Then Mr. Higgins said : 'Why don't
you face it Ned. You have had it.' He
said : 'We have all the business and all
you have left is this bunch of old furniture downstairs and some money in the
bank.' He said: 'Why don't you be a good
guy and buy Nels out and release him~
We'll be on our way and we'll bear you
no hard feelings at all.' "
Mr. Higgins never denied that these statements
were made by him to Mr. Hoggan and, of course,
it showed without question a joint action or agreement on the part of the two defendants. No other
connotation can be put on the word ~'we" when Mr.
Higgins states, "We have the accounts locked in."
And "We have the business."
The rule is set forth in 16 Am. Jur. 2d Con·
spiracy, Section 48:
"JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY. Each
act done in pursuance of the conspiracy by
one of several conspirators is, in contempla·
ti on of law, an act for which each is jointly
and severally liable. This joint and several
liability of a conspirator applies to damages
accruing prior to his joining the conspiracy
as well as damages thereafter resulting, and
regardless of whether he took a prominent or
an inconspicuous part in the execution of the
conspiracy. This liability of each member of
a conspiracy for the damage resulting there·
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from exists whether or not the conspirator
profited from the result of the conspiracy.
Before a person who joins an existing conspiracy will be held liable for what was previously done pursuant to the conspiracy, however, it must be shown that he joined the conspiracy with knowledge of the unlawfulness
of its object or of the means contemplated.
And a conspirator who withdraws from a
conspiracy is not responsible for subsequent
acts committed by his former confederates."
The above rule illustrates the principle that
one joining the conspiracy is liable for damages
accruing prior to the time that he joined if it is
shown that he joined with knowledge of the unlawfulness of its object or the means contemplated to
accomplish the objective. Mr. Higgins is legally
charged with the knowledge that his duty to his
corporation, the plaintiff, was that of a fiduciary
and the attempted destruction of the corporation
by he and Mr. Hall was unlawful.
A case in point is DeVries vs. Brumback, 349
P. 2d 532 (Cal.). This was an action on conversion
against defendant who obtained some jewelry that
had been stolen from the plaintiff. This defendant
did not join in the conspiracy until some time after
the robbery had been committed, but he did know of
the robbery and took into his possession the greater
part of the stolen property. Defendant argued that
he could not be responsible for the full amount because the full amount had not ~ome into his possession. The Court notes the distinction between the
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crime of conspiracy and the tort of conspiracy hold.
Ing:
~'~e~e the findings established that appellant,
within a few hours after the robbery, joined
the continuing conspiracy to convert and with
full knowledge of the prior acts of his co-conspirators, actively participated in the overall
purpose to convert all of the stolen property
to their use and benefit. As such act of participant, appellant was a joint tort feasor
liable for the entire damage done in pursuance of the common design. In such circum.
stances, the question of whether or not all or
part of the unrecovered stolen property ever
came into appellant's personal possession is
immaterial."
It would have been otherwise in a criminal case
wherein a person could not have been held responsible for those acts committed to the time he joined
the conspiracy.

On the above facts and law defendant Higgins
is fully liable to plaintiff.
POINT III.
THE LOSS SUSTAINED BY PLAINTIFF WAS
CAUSED BY DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT AND THE
COUR'T PROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES THERE·
FOR.

Defendants argue under their Point III that
no loss was caused to plaintiff by their wrongful
conduct because the accounts in question would have
left plaintiff anyway; and their conduct could not,
then be the proximate cause of loss.
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The fallacy of this argument may be demonstrated by analogy. Assume a person afflicted with
a fatal disease. Assume also that this person is
killed by the wrongful act of a third person. Could
that third person successfully argue that he could
avoid the payment of damages because the dead person was not going to live much longer anyway?
Would a person be any less guilty of murder if his
victim was afflicted with a fatal illness?
But further, consideration of the evidence and
inferences to be drawn therefrom will show that
causation is not the problem in this case that defendants would have the court believe.
Mr. Hall testified that he did not need the
business of these accounts because he was free to
leave the plaintiff any time he chose and that he
possessed skills that he could sell in the market
place at any time (R. 120, 121).
Mr. Higgins testified that he welcomed Mr.
Hall as an associate whether he brought any business or not (R. 214).
Why then, was it necessary for these two gentlemen to solicit the advertising business of these accounts? The reason, of course, is that they were not
at all sure that this business would automatically follow their departure and it was necessary for Mr.
Hall to exercise the advertising skills he possessed to
make sure that when he left he would have the business ~'locked in". As noted above he did this by taking
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full advantage of the intimate association he had
with the client and by casting the impression that
plaintiff was in dire financial straits; and that he
and Mr. Hogan were splitting up. This disparity of
image created by Mr. Hall made the decision of
the client to go with him easily predictable.
Had these defendants possesed even the most
primitive sense of business ethics and had they observed even the most rudimentary rules of the fiduciary relation legally imposed upon them as directors of pla:intiff corporation this lawsuit would not
have resulted. They would have informed Mr. Hoggan of their decision to leave and the subject of the
accounts would have naturally arisen. Plaintiff
would then have had the opportunity to present to
the client evidence of its financial ability, continu·
i ty of service and new advertising ideas and programs. Mr. Hall would have the same opportunity.
Under these circumstances the client could have
made an intelligent choice, and an actionable wrong
would not have been committed.
Under the proper circumstances outlined above
we do not know what the clients would have done.
This point is illustrated by the testimony of Mr.
Wilson of Wilson Transport Supply.
What difference would it have made in
your decision, had he not held any dis·
cussion with you in respect to this mat·
ter at all?
"A. Well, that is a difficult question. If he

"Q.
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-hadn't had any discussion and had left
the agency, I'm not too sure whether
he would have continued to or whether
he wouldn't have. It's a difficult question to ask. I mean to answer." (R. 289)
Mr. Wilson is referring to whether he would have
stayed with Mr. Hall absent solicitation.
Defendants cite with emphasis the case of
Nichols-Morris v. Morris, 17 4 F. Supp. 691, S.D.N.Y.
in support of their theory on causation. Plaintiff
cites the case with equal emphasis. The court found
in that case that defendant solicited the business of
Nichols-Miller a customer of the plaintiff corporation, while defendant was still an officer and director of plaintiff. It further found that the business of this customer was cancellable and would undoubtedly be cancelled and awarded to defendant
when he terminated his employment without any
inducement on his part. Nonetheless, the court found
that defendant had breached his duty toward plaintiff and awarded plaintiff judgment in the amount
of $22,500.00. Had the court followed the novel
theory advanced by defendant in this case, the court
could not have awarded damages because the loss
was not proximately caused by defendant's wrongful conduct.
A case of greater import is again that of Duane
Jones Co., Inc. v. Burke, et al. (supra). As to caus-

ation the court held :

"Defendants-appellants also urge as a basis
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for reversal of the judgment rendered against
them, that plaintiff failed sufficiently to es.
tablish a causal relationship between damages
sustained by plaintiff and the alleged wrong.
ful conduct by the defendants. For this argu.
ment defendants rely upon ( 1) The fact that
none of the accounts were under contract to
plaintiff agency, and (2) The fact that there
is evidence of record from which it may inf erred that plaintiff had "resigned" all of
its accounts in August, 1951, prior to the soJi.
citation of such accounts by the individual defendants. Plaintiff was not required to show
interference by defendants with existing con.
tractual relationships in order to impose Ji.
ability in the present action. (Citing cases).
As was said in Keviczky v. Lorber, 290 N.Y.
297, 306, 49 N.E.2d 146, 150, 146 A.L.R.
1410: 'An injury to a person's business by
procuring others not to deal with him or by
getting away his customers, if unlawful
means are employed, such as fraud or intimi·
dation, or if done without justifiable cause.
is an actionable wrong.' 2 Cooley on Torts
Sec. 230. Moreover, there is evidence of rec·
ord from which the jury might have inferred
that the loss of customers suffered by plain·
tiff in August and September, 1951, was .t~e
direct result of defendants-appellants' actlVI·
ties immediately prior thereto. Plaintiff in:
traduced evidence of the customers it had
serviced for varying periods of time prior .to
June 28, 1951, and which it was then serv1c·
ing; it established activities by defendanti
as to demands made upon plaintiff to sur·
render the business to defendants, accomp·
anied by threats of mass resignation pursu·
ant to a scheme reputed to have been 'pre
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sold' to the customers; it proved solicitation
by defendants of plaintiff's accounts and personnel, and, finally, it established a mass exodus to the corporate defendant of plaintiff's
customers and a majority of its key personnel. Upon that state of the record, the jury
was entitled to find that plaintiff's losses
were a proximate result of defendants' conduct."
The evidence 'in this record closely parallels
that of the Duane Jones case and compels the same
result.
POINT IV.

THE DAMAGES AW ARD ED 'TO PLAINTIFF
WERE BASED UPON CORRECT PRINCIPLES OF
LAW.

Appellants argue ( 1) That the gross receipts
of the advertising accounts and Hall's present salary
are not proper elements of damage, and (2) Plaintiff suffered no loss of profits and, therefore, suffered no damage.
Defendants argue at length by reference to
the financial statements of the plaintiff that the
accounts in question would not have produced any
profit for plaintiff. However, Mr. Hall was receiving a salary of $1,100.00 a month while in plaintiff's employ and all of their accounting is based on
that salary. This is basic to their premise and it is
faulty. Had the accounts remained with the plaintiff,
they could have been serviced by less expensive
help or by the remaining principal, Mr. Hoggan
Defendants' argument must fail for another reason,
namely that they argue that in addition to Mr.
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Hall's salary of $1,100.00 a month, there must be
added $8,118.00 for overhead and the combination
of these two figures is greater than the gross rev.
enue produced by the accounts for the year 1963.
There is no evidence as to which portion of the
overhead is applicable to these accounts. Defendan~
have simply attempted to spread the overhead pro.
rata and obviously this cannot be done in any busi.
ness without a detailed cost accounting.
In considering the elements of damage in this
case the court should be mindful that although de.
fendants Higgins and Hall were employees of plaintiff and subject to the duties legally flowing from
that relationship they owe to plaintiff the higher
duty of that of a fiduciary because they were both
officers and directors of plaintiff corporation. They
owed the utmost loyalty, fairness and good faith
in their dealings with plaintiff and its business.
They became dissatisfied with their association with
plaintiff, but rather than express this in a legally
acceptab1e fashion, they chose a path calculated to
cripple if not destroy the plaintiff by seizing iti
business for themselves.
When it comes to affixing damages for such
a wrong must the court look only to whether plain·
tiff suffered a loss of profits (net) as suggested by
defendants? The answer is no. It is a matter of
common knowledge that small closely held corpora·
tions rarely if ever show a book profit. Their profits
are customarily represented by the salaries drawn
by the principal officers and directors.
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If this court were to look solely to the element
of loss of net profits in a case such as this where
a director sets out to cripple his own corporation,
then the wrong would be acknowledged but the
wrongdoer would escape unscathed by the payment
of nominal damages. The terms loyalty, fair dealing and good faith as applied to a corporate director would lose all meaning except to legal scholars.
The courts have wisely adopted an approach designed to protect the corporation from its wrongdoing directors. The law looks not only to the loss
sustained by the corporation, but looks with even
more emphasis upon the gain and unjust enrichment attained by the wrongdoer.
Liitherland v. Dahlen, 53 A2d 143, (Pa.).

"It should certainly be unnecessary to state
once more in detail the principles of law and
equity governing the duties owed to a corporation by its directors and officers, for those
principles have been repeatedly enunciated.
Suffice it to say that it is well settled; and
indeed, is embodied in the statutory law of
the Commonwealth, (Citing statute), that officers and directors are deemed to stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation. They
must devote themselves to the corporate affairs
with a view to promote the common interest
and not their own, and they cannot, either
directly or indirectly, utilize their position to
obtain any personal profit or advantage other
than that enjoyed by their fellow shareholders. (Ci ting cases.) In short, there is demanded of the officer or director of a corpor41

ation ~hat he furnish to it his un~ivided loy.
alty; if there is presented to him an op.
portunity which is within the scope of its
own activities. and the pr~sent or potential
advantage to it, the law will not permit hilll
to seize the opportunity for himself; if he
does so, the corporation may elect to claim all
the benefits of the transaction. Nor is it ma.
terial that his dealings may not have caused
a loss or been harmful to the corporation· the
test of his liability is whether he has un]utly
gained enrichment."
See also Craig v. Graphic Arts Studio, Inc., 160
A2d 444 (Del.) For a leading California case Hall
v. Dekker, 115 P2d 15 (Cal.)
In this case the business involved was the wholesale floral business. Hall commenced the business in
1930. In 1930 Dekker was employed to manage the
Los Angeles branch. In September 1931, he became
a partner. In November 1934 the business was in·
corporated and defendant Dekker received stock and
was elected vice president of the corporation. He
remained an officer and director through January
1938. On that date while still an officer and director
of plaintiff another corporation was organized by
former employees of the plaintiff and the new cor·
poration was promoted, and financed by defendant
Dekker. He solicited business for the new competi·
tor and obtained orders from plaintiff's customers,
Defendants contended on appeal that this evidence
did not state a cause of action against them. The
court held:
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"This proposition is untenable ... It is the
established law that a director or officer of
a corporation may not enter into a competing enterprise which cripples or injures the
business of the corporation of which he is an
officer or director. (Ci ting cases) . Vice Chancellor Leaming thus accurately states the rule
in Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris,
supra, at page 250 of 89 Atlantic, 'It was not
lawfully possible for the defendant while a
director and treasurer of complainant corporation to enter into an opposition business
in his own behalf of such a nature that it
would cripple or injure the corporation he
represented."
This case was followed in a later California
case of Cavanaugh Nailing Machine Co. v. Cavanaugh, 334 P2d 954 (Cal.)

A further statement of the rule is contained
in Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A2d 503 (Del.)
"If an officer or director of a corporafion, in
violation of his duty as such, acquires gain
or advantage for himself, the law charges the
interest so acquired with a trust for the benefit of the corporation, at its election, while it
denies to the betrayer all benefits and profit.
The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in
its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow
ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence,
but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that, for the purpose of removing
all temptation extinguishes all possibility
flowing from a breach of the confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation. Given the
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relation between the parties, a certain result
follows; and a constructive trust is the remri.
dial device through which precedence of self
is compelled to give way to the stern demands
of loyalty."
With this principle in mind plaintiff's approach
to the question of damage is from two standpoints:
( 1) The value of an advertising account to an
agency and ( 2) The revenue derived and expected
from the accounts taken plus the gain to defend.'
dants and the likelihood that it would continue.
Mr. Alfred H. Garrigues, a prominent Salt
Lake City advertising executive testified on plaintiff's behalf concerning the value of an account. He
had had recent occasion to value the accounts in
his business when it was changed from a partnership to a corporation. His experience was gained
with his agency management and a great deal of
reference material ( R. 182). For his purposes he
assumed an account that had gross annual billing
of $100,000.00. Customarily an agency would de·
rive 15 % commission or $15,000.00 gross revenue
from that account. (Note: The evidence showed that
the accounts produced $15, 709. 7 4 gross revenue in
1964 and $17,272.35 in 1963. These figures are
roughly equivalent to those used by Mr. Garrigues.l
He first considered that an account would cal'!').
with it an acquisition cost. By this he meant the
time spent in contacting the account and doing
the research and preparation of material necessary
to make a presentation to the client.
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Mr. Garrigues testified that in his experience
he would assign a minimum cost of 5 per cent of the
annual billing of an account to acquisition cost (R.
183). Assuming, therefore, an annual billing for the
account of $100,000.00, a minimum acquisition cost
would be $5, 000. 00.
Mr. Garrigues next considered that another factor in evaluating an account was the indoctrination
cost (R. 190). This was time spent after the initiation of the account necessary to get the account off
the ground before it became a paying proposition. He
did not assign any monetary value to a specific
account involving an annual billing of $100,000.00,
but nonetheless considered this a valuation problem
because it represented an unrecovered cost to the
agency ( R. 191).
Mr. Garrigues concluded by testifying that a
third and most important factor is that the account
would have a value in addition to the acquisition and
indoctrination cost of between one month's gross
billing and one year's gross revenue. Using an account billing $100,000.00 per year, that account
would have an annual revenue at the customary 15
per cent commission of $15,000.00 and that account
would have an average monthly b"illing of between
$8,000.00 and $9,000.00. Mr. Garrigues would value
such an account to his agency of $20,000.00 combining the factors of valuation, acquisition, and indoctrination (R. 192-193).
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The accounts taken by defendants from the
plaintiff actually had produced during 1963 the
sum of $17,272.35 and in 1964, the year that they
were taken from plaintiff, the sum of $15,709.74.
There is also before the Court the evidence of Mr.
Hoggan that the total advertising business done by
a client is most likely to increase over the years,
(R. 247)
We turn now to the enrichment or gain enjoyed
by Mr. Higgins and Mr. Hall from the accounts
solicited. It should be noted that all of the acquisition and indoctrination costs that were part of these
accounts had already been absorbed by the plaintiff.
and there would be no transitional costs because
Mr. Hall was already familiar with the accounts as
he had done their advertising in the past. This is,
of course, a benefit to defendants. We also note that
at the time this action was tried in January of 1965,
approximately 11 months after Mr. Hall left the
employ of the plaintiff, he was drawing a salary
from the corporation of Higgins & Hall of $1,250.00
per month. Necessarily, a good part of that salary,
if not all of it, would be derived from the work he
was doing for the accounts that he took from plain·
tiff (Ex. 3p) & (Ex. 9p).
The lower court would also have considered a
likelihood of the accounts remaining with defen·
dants for some future time. At the time of the trial
in January, 1965, the accounts had been with the
defendants for approximately 1 year and each of
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the accounts expressed a desire and willingness that
their business stay with the defendants. It is true
that no one can predict the future, but at least it
appears from all of the available evidence that the
gain to defendants in this case would be a continuing one and, of course, a continuin'g loss to the
plaintiff.
Again we refer to the Duane Jones case, supra,
' wherein it is stated:
"If plaintiff established wrongful conduct by
defendants as alleged in the Amended Complaint - and the jury found that it did it was entitled to recover as damages the
amount of loss sustained by it, including opportunities for profit on the accounts diverted from it through the defendant's conduct
(Citing cases.) Under the facts here presented, plaintiff's loss was a continuing one extending at least up to the date of trial. It is
no answer that the amount of profit plaintiff would have made cannot be definitely established by proof at the trial. 'There is no
good reason for requiring any higher degree
of certainty in respect to the amount of damages than in respect to any branch of the
cause. Juries are allowed to act upon probable
and inferential as well as direct and positive
proof. And when from the nature of the case
the damages cannot be estimated by certainty,
or only a part of them can be so estimated, no
objection is perceived placing before the jury
all the facts and circumstances of the case
having any tendency to show damages or
their probable amount, so as to enable them
to make the most intelligible and accurate
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estimate which the nature of the case will
permit. ( 1 Southern on Damages [4th Edition 1916] Section 70) .' "
In the case of Gould vs. Mountain States Tele.
phone and Telegraph Company, 6 Utah, Utah second
187, 309 P. 2d 802, this Court stated:
"The rule against recovery of uncertain dam.
ages is generally directed against uncertainty with respect to cause rather than to measure or extent, so that a party who has broken his contract will not ordinarily be permitted to escape liability because of uncertainty
in the amount of damages resulting, and the
fact that the full extent of damages for breach
of contract must be a matter of speculation,
it is not a ground for refusing all damages.''
There was no evidence in the Duane Jones case
(supra) that the damages awarded by the jury were
based upon loss of net profits from the accounts.
On the contrary, it appears from a reading of that
case that the damages were assessed on the basis
of overall loss to the corporation and gain to the
defendants by reason of their conspiracy to injure
the plaintiff corporation and benefit therefrom. The
fact that the jury verdict was in the even amount
of $300,000.00 would be indicative of this.
Plaintiff again states that the measure of dam·
ages in a case such as this is not especially the loss
to the plaintiff corporation, but rather the gain and
enrichment to defendants. They now have busines~
which produced for them gross revenues of over
$15,000.00 in 1964 and it was reasonable for the
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Court to conclude that they would enjoy these benefits in the future. the judgment of $25,000.00
awarded to plaintif based upon these elements is
therefore reasonable and proper. As with other factual issues, the amount of damages is within the
province of the trier of fact and should not be disturbed on appeal.
POINT V.
THE COURT DID MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT
nN ALL MATERIAL ISSUES IN THE CASE.

The issues before the trial court as set forth
in the Pre-trial Order were:
1. Was there a conspiracy between Higgins
& Hall, while still in the employment of plaintiff?
2. If there was a conspiracy, did the defendants solicit the plaintiff's accounts while still in
the employ of plaintiff?
3. If it is determined that the defendants did
acquire and solicit, what is the plaintiff's damage?
4. Further, is the plaintiff entitled to a permanent injunction against the defendants? (Plaintiff did not seek further injunctive relief at the
trial.)

In addition, defendants claimed that damages,
if any, were not the proximate result of any wrongful conduct on their part (R. 18).
Without setting forth verbatim the Findings
and Conclusions of the lower court, it is sufficient
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to say that the court fully answered each of the

issues posed in the Pre-Trial Order and concludeu
that plaintiff was damaged by the wrongful conduct
of the defendants. These Findings implicitly cover
the questions presented in defendants' Brief as to
damage and proximate cause and, therefore, defen.
dants' criticism of the lower court's findings is not
meritorious.
CONCLUSION
So far as can be ascertained, this case involving wrongful solicitation by an account executive
of an advertising agency is only the second case of
its kind ever to reach a court of last resort in this
country. (The Duane Jones case (supra) was the
first.) The decision of the Court in this case will
be far reaching in the advertising industry.
The critical events in this law suit occurred
between February 13 and February 18, 1964. Mr.
Hall and Mr. Higgins, both officers and directors
of the plaintiff corporation, had expressed dissatis·
faction with their association with plaintiff. Mr
Higgins elected to terminate and so expressed him·
self to Mr. Hoggan, the remaining principal in th[
corporation on February 13, 1964. Mr. Hall at tha:
time was undecided. At that time also both defen·
dants were informed that the accounts then beint
serviced by Mr. Hall were not his, but belonged t
the corporation. Thereafter without informing any
one, on February 17, 1964 Mr. Hall directly solicitei
1
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the advertising business of the accounts he had ser\'iced and these accounts transferred their allegiance to him. (Salt Lake Mattress Company which
had first agreed to go, later decided otherwise).
When Mr~ Hall had obtained these accounts, he announced his decision to leave the plaintiff. Thereafter both Mr. Higgins and Mr. Hall solicited the
Wilson Transport Supply account and later in February, they formed a new corporation entitled Higgins & Hall and this corporation was in business
March 1, 1964. On February 29, 1964, both defenrlants entered the offices of the plaintiff and removed all the files and records pertaining to these accounts. Still later in April of 1964 while defendants
were under a Court Restraint, Mr. Hall cancelled a
13-week KSL-TV contract of plaintiff which he had
negotiated in February and transferred it to Higgins
& Hall.
These acts: Solicitation of plaintiff's customers; removing plaintiff's files and records; and interferring with the plaintiff's contracts constituted
a clear violation of the fiduciary duties imposed upon defendants as officers and directors of plaintiff
and were in the very least an attempt to cripple or
destroy the plaintiff. The lower court so found and
indeed a contrary finding would be totally unwarranted by the evidence.
The measure of damages in this case is both
the loss to the plaintiff and the gain and enrichment
of defendants. During 1964 these accounts produc51

ed a gross revenue of over $15,000.00. The judgment of the Court awarding $25,000.00 in damagPs
to plaintiff is less than two years revenue from the~e
accounts and the Court also had before it the fmther evidence that defendants were likely to enjoy
the benefits of this business in the future. Clearly
the defendants in this case were enriched to that
extent.
The judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent
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